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LINGUISTIC FACTORS IN THE OVERALL AVIATION SAFETY FRAMEWORK
Bourgeois-Bougrine, S. ; Normier, V. ; Mollard, R.
Laboratoire d’Anthropologie Appliquée (LAA) - Ergonomie - Comportement et Interactions (EA 4070)
Université Paris Descartes, France
Ferrante, O. ; Pouliquen, Y.
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile (BEA), Le Bourget, France
Feedback on occurrences and some safety studies prompted ICAO to recommend new language proficiency
requirements. This paper focuses on the type of data that influenced this effort to reduce accidents involving the
“language barrier”. It also proposes to better define and record the linguistic factors in databases. A literature review
on the main linguistic contributory factors to air-ground miscommunications breaks them down into sub-categories.
Subsequently, the paper discusses the “language barrier” as a potential “safety barrier”. It seems essential to better
track and record these successful safety barriers (or nets) related to human behaviors. They should be expanded
through a “positive” taxonomy that would ultimately help in evaluating the resilience of the aviation system.
into an accident. This paper will also address how
linguistic safety nets could be a subset of a positive
taxonomy geared to better record the resilience of the
aviation system.

Introduction
After a fatal Runway Incursion that occurred on May
25, 2000 at Paris Charles de Gaulle, the BEA
recommended that:
“in the light of the analysis of this accident and
previously acquired experience, the DGAC study the
expediency and methods of implementation for the
systematic use of the English language for air traffic
control at the Paris Charles de Gaulle aerodrome, as
well as the extension of this measure to other
aerodromes with significant international traffic.”
(BEA, 2002)

Accidents and linguistic factors
Recent statements tying accidents to poor language
proficiency highlight a need for new regulations on
English proficiency: “[…] concern grew over English
language proficiency as a result of some high profile
accidents and incidents. Between 1976 and 2000,
more than 1,100 passengers and crew lost their lives
in accidents in which investigators determined that
language had played a contributory role” (Matthews,
2004). These concerns contributed to implementing
higher standards at an international level.

Although the report had stressed that the
investigation did not aim to evaluate the advantages
and disadvantages of the systematic use of a single
language, this recommendation has often been
misinterpreted. This paper will put emphasis on
linguistic factors from different perspectives.

The following review is not intended to downplay the
role of language proficiency for aviation safety, but is
seen as an opportunity to better define, record and
ultimately analyze data on linguistic factors. Among
the well known accidents1 referred to when safety is
tied to language issues, linguistic factors never
appear as the “central” cause. They were generally
considered as contributory factors under the broad
term of “communication”. Investigation authorities
seldom explicitly cite language issues in their
conclusions (in section 3 of the standardized format
of ICAO Annex 13 Final Reports). These issues are
more often found in the section related to the analysis
(section 2).

It will first consider how to link linguistic factors to
accident data stored in the Accident/Incident Data
Reporting system (ADREP) system operated by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Some statements have oversimplified communication
problems and suggested a link to inadequate language
skills without any analysis. The next part will
elaborate on linguistic factors by proposing some
definitions and by studying how they could be better
recorded and tracked in databases to facilitate safety
analyses. Finally, as the aviation system has been
moving from a reactive paradigm to a more proactive
data-driven paradigm, it seems essential to record and
analyze both the strengths and weaknesses of the
system. From a broader perspective, data-driven
safety measures should take into account the
resilience of some safety nets, such as successful
behaviors, that prevented an incident from turning

1

- Aircraft Collision: Boeing 747, PH-BUF, KLM and Boeing
747, N737PA, Pan Am, Los Rodeos (Tenerife), March 27, 1977.
- Fuel Exhaustion: Avianca Flight 052, Boeing 707, HK-2016;
Cove Neck, New York; January 25, 1990.
- Controlled Flight Into Terrain: American Airlines Flight 965;
Boeing 757, N651AA; near Cali, Colombia; December 20, 1995.
- Etc.
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The final report on the accident that occurred on
August 14, 2005, to a Boeing 737 operated by Helios
Airways is a good example. The German pilot and
the Cypriot co-pilot did not identify the aural
pressurization alarm. They continued climbing with a
non-pressurized aircraft and became incapacitated
due to hypoxia. In the analysis part of this report, the
commission stressed that: “as English was not the
Captain’s native language and under the influence of
stress, this possibility could not totally be ruled out.
[…] Also, human performance, and particularly
memory, is known to suffer from the effects of stress,
thus implying that in a stressful situation the search
and choice of words to express one’s concern in a
non-native language can be severely compromised”
(AAIASB, 2006). However, the conclusions of this
report do not mention the “language barrier” as a
possible contributing factor neither in the direct
causes, latent causes nor in the contributing factors to
this accident.

explanatory factors, thus introducing active or latent
factors. Finally, in its latest version (ADREP 2000),
the SHELL2 model was integrated at the level of the
explanatory factors to cover the aviation system. This
multilayered structure gives flexibility in analyzing
system failures. Indeed, the SHELL items are also
presented in tree lists (Figure 2) and each item can be
applied from the sharp end to the blunt end (on
persons or organizations, i.e. respectively recording
active or systemic failures). In ADREP 2000,
investigators can code as many events (“n”) and
factors as needed to record and analyze an accident or
an incident. Descriptive and explanatory factors can
be refined by modifiers.
Current linguistic factors in ADREP 2000
There are currently three ways of recording linguistic
factors identified during an investigation in the
ADREP system. First, the term “not understood language barrier” is available as a modifier both at
the descriptive and explanatory levels. Then, the
SHELL items (i.e. at the explanatory level) contain
two keywords (“language” and “accent”) related to
linguistic factors (Figure 2).

The piece of information stressed in the analysis is
worth being recorded in the ADREP data report, the
report that States are required to send to ICAO for
data dissemination and accident prevention purposes.
A future query on linguistic factors will accordingly
retrieve this accident in the example of a study on
stress and language. This emphasizes the need to use
a common methodology for investigation and data
collection which could allow better integration of
human issues. The latest ADREP taxonomy version
developed by ICAO contains a causal model that
supports and articulates active and organizational
deficiencies.
ADREP taxonomy

Figure 2. SHELL Model - language and accent
factors

Figure 1. ADREP /SHELL causal structure tied to
the investigation questions
The ADREP structure (Figure 1), which was initially
based on a sequence of events in the seventies, was
completed in the eighties by descriptive and

2
SHELL: Software (procedures, symbology, etc.), Hardware
(machine, ergonomics, etc.), Environment and Liveware (human)
(Edwards, 1972 modified by Hawkins, 1987).
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Eurocontrol recently used the SHELL model to
analyze spoken communications between air traffic
controllers and flight crews (Van Es, 2004). The
interface L-L is between the controller and the pilot
in charge of radio communications (Figure 3). The
controller and the pilot have interfaces with their own
environment, hardware, and software blocks. For
instance, a pilot cannot have an interface with the
controller's hardware.

This table ties language problems to non-standard
phraseology and also mentions controller accent as a
recurrent factor.
Querying repositories using the ADREP taxonomy
A query based on the ADREP/SHELL linguistic
factors was built with ECCAIRS3. It was applied on
various databases (BEA, EASA and ICAO) that are
all using the ECCAIRS software, which is ADREP
2000 compatible (Menzel, 2004). The query returned
mixed results. The number of occurrences was
relatively low (between twenty and thirty). Only one
of the “well known” occurrences was retrieved. This
was the case of the Paris Runway collision that was
analyzed and simultaneously coded in the process of
the investigation. On the positive side, other
interesting cases came out; recent occurrences appear
to have been investigated and analyzed with a
methodology based on the ADREP 2000.
Interestingly, the related reports were retrieved from
the three repositories queried. This also shows that
data exchange through the ADREP system using a
common tool (ECCAIRS) is becoming a reality.

Figure 3. Illustration of pilot and ATC interface
In a follow-up study, Eurocontrol organized a
reporting campaign with questionnaires sent to airline
pilots and air traffic controllers to determine the
situation in Europe (Van Es et al, 2006). Regarding
the main surveyed communication problems, 344
pilots and controllers reported both:
- linguistic factors such as accent, speech rate,
ambiguous phraseology (see table) and
- non linguistic factors such as distraction, fatigue,
workload.
Problems

The ADREP/SHELL structure allows to describe and
to explain in details the various interfaces for any
occurrence. On the other hand, its complexity has
often deterred end-users from coding in depth the
factors of an accident or incident. The use of a
methodology that addresses the various factors in the
course of an investigation can overcome this issue.
When applied, the clear breakdown of occurrences
into events and factors allows to better tackle
systemic issues; 1) for short term goals, to draft and
release consistent reports and to support convincing
safety recommendations; 2) for a long term objective,
to capture in a structured way (in databases) the key
factors and the lessons learned for future safety
analyses (Ferrante et al, 2004).

Contributing factors

Similar call
sign

Controller accent (34%),
Controller speech rate (28%), Pilot
distraction (22%), Pilot
expectation (25%) and Pilot
fatigue (20%)
Frequency
Controller accent (51%),
change
Controller speech rate (42%), Pilot
distraction (43%), Pilot fatigue
(35%) and Pilot workload (31%)
Non standard Controller (64%) and pilot (41%)
phraseology non standard phraseology,
Controller accent (49%), language
problems (46%), Ambiguous
phraseology (41%)
Blocked
Frequency congestion (63%),
transmission Controller workload (33%),
Untimely transmission (27%),
Pilot workload (22%), Long
message (20%)

Focus on linguistic factors
As mentioned in the Eurocontrol findings the line
between phraseology and language seems blurry
although it is clearly segregated in the ADREP
taxonomy. Linguistic factors could be broken down
into five sub-categories: context and expectations,
code switching, speech intelligibility, paralinguistic
factors, aviation English jargon ambiguities.

3
ECCAIRS: European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident
Reporting Systems. ECCAIRS release 4 is a database system
developed by the European Commission (Joint Research Centre
located in Ispra, Italy) that supports the ADREP 2000 taxonomy.
http://eccairs-www.jrc.it/Start.asp
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Pragmatics: Context and expectations

adjectives to follow it. The same is true for switching
from French to English after a noun and before an
adjective. Code-switching between a subject and its
verb is more likely, because both English and French
normally place the subject before the verb.

Pragmatics is a branch of linguistics concerned with
bridging the explanatory gap between sentence
meaning and speaker’s meaning. For Grice (1989),
the crucial feature of pragmatic interpretation is its
“inferential” nature: the hearer is seen as constructing
and evaluating a hypothesis about the speaker’s
meaning, based, on the one hand, on the meaning of
the sentence uttered, and, on the other, on
background or contextual assumptions and general
communicative principles which speakers are
normally expected to observe. Context here must be
interpreted as “situation” as it may include any
extralinguistic factor, including discourse, social,
environmental, and psychological factors.

Speech intelligibility
The ICAO language proficiency requirements apply
to native and non native speakers alike. English today
is spoken by more non-native speakers than native
speakers. The focus has to be put not only on the
intelligibility of non-native speakers to native
speakers but also on the interaction between nonnative speakers. The intelligibility of non-native
speakers depends on the extent to which their
languages share phonological and grammatical
features. The phoneme differences between
languages result in situations where distinct
phonemes in one language are interpreted as being
the same by foreigners. For example Japanese
speakers cannot detect the difference between /r/ and
/l/ sounds and cannot make the distinction when
speaking English. As a consequence native speakers
of these languages are quite unable to perceive the
difference in English unless they have made a special
effort to learn to do so. Therefore, according to
ICAO, English native speakers have to familiarize
themselves with the dangers of cross cultural
communications (Mathews, 2004).

In the Tenerife collision between KLM Boeing 747
and Pan American Airways Boeing 747, the KLM
pilot understood “you are cleared to take-off” when a
few seconds earlier the tower controller said: “KLM
eight seven zero five you are cleared to the Papa
Beacon, climb and maintain flight level nine zero,
right turn after take-off…”. For the controller it was
the instruction following a take-off clearance that was
still to come.
Code switching
The Tenerife collision is also an example of code
switching, when the KLM pilot radioed, “we are at
take-off” to express take-off instead of the standard
phraseology “Taking-off”. The controller interpreted
that literally, indicating a place, the “take-off point”
waiting for further instruction and so did not warn the
pilot that Pan American Airways B747 (invisible in
thick frog) was already on the runway. The Dutch
speaking pilot switched into Dutch grammatical
construction while keeping English words. The form
of a verb that is expressed in English by the suffix
“ing” happens to be expressed in Dutch by the
equivalent of the infinitive (Cushing, 1995).

Paralinguistic factors (e.g. intonation, stress)
Paralinguistic factors can change the form and the
meaning of a sentence by acting across individual
sounds or words of the sentence. The Avianca 052
accident investigation indicated that ATC did not
perceive the severity of the fuel crisis aboard AV052
and therefore did not treat the situation as an
emergency. Intonation and pitch have a critical role
in communication (Fegyveresi, 1997). Under stress
or complex situations, speech becomes more rapid
and more frequent. The change in pitch, which can
cause “slips of the tongue”, is also a sign of a
stressful environment or high task complexity (Prinzo
and Britton, 1993).

Code switching is a term in linguistics referring to
alternation between two or more languages, dialects,
or language registers in the course of discourse
between people who have more than one language in
common. Sometimes the switch lasts only for a few
sentences, or even for a single phrase. Codeswitching often occurs in bilingual communities or
families. Code-switching within a sentence tends to
occur more often at points where the syntaxes of the
two languages align; thus it is uncommon to switch
from English to French after an adjective and before
a noun, because a French noun normally “expects” its

Aviation English jargon ambiguities
Aviation parameters meaning-The numbers used in
pilot-controller communication are shared by
multiple aviation parameters: flight level, heading, air
speed, airline flight number. The overlapping number
ranges can lead to misunderstandings, especially
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under high workload pressure. For example, an
aircraft was flying on a heading of 300 degrees at
FL270; the controller vectored it to “three one zero”;
the pilot acknowledge “three one zero” and climbed
to FL310 instead of turning to a course of 310
degrees (Cushing, 1995). A full readback would
correct the misunderstanding in this instance.

The paradox is that, in the public report produced by
India (Government of India, 1997), only one factor is
mentioned: “Pilot - Disregard of ATC instructions by
the Kazak aircraft”. No reference to language
proficiency is explicitly stressed whereas it is deemed
causal in the Indian Assembly resolution. In the other
accident (B757 Cali) cited in this resolution, the
controller told the investigators that “had the pilots
been Spanish-speaking, he would have told them that
their request made little sense and that it was
illogical and incongruent. He said that because of
limitations in his command of English, he was unable
to convey these thoughts to the crew.” (FSF, 2006)

This kind of confusion is aggravated when an ATC
single message includes two or more sets of numbers.
Mishearing numbers has occurred most frequently
when single, one sentence clearance messages call
for two or more separate pilot actions, such as “cross
XYZ at one thousand, descend and maintain one zero
thousand, reduce speed to 250 knots…” In the
Eurocontrol survey, pilots and controllers think that a
frequency change is often erroneously copied when it
is part of a long message; it is recommended to limit
the number of instructions per call and to issue a
frequency change as a single instruction (Van Es et
al, 2006).

Adequate language proficiency could have
constituted an effective safety net in the Cali
accident. So far, language has generally been
considered negatively through accidents and the term
“language barrier”. Seldom has it been seen
positively as a “safety barrier” or a “safety net”. A
language barrier does not necessarily result in unsafe
operations, although language and cultural diversity
can intensify differences and confusions in
communication (Hörmann, 2001). Merritt and
Ratwatte (1997) conducted a study to compare safety
performance between mono- versus multi-cultural
cockpits. They found that although language barriers
and cultural differences are inhibiting the open
communication and team fellowship, multi cultural
crews, especially crewmembers with English as a
second language had to concisely verbalize their
intent and requirements and perform “by the book”.
This led to rule-based behavior, with a high degree of
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) being used.

Homophones,
homographs,
synonyms
and
homonyms-Some pilot-controller communication
errors arise from the pronunciation of different words
that sound almost alike or exactly alike such as “to”
and “two” (homophones). For example: ATC cleared
the aircraft to descend “two four zero zero”. The pilot
read back “ok. four zero zero”. The aircraft then
descended to 400 feet instead of 2400 feet.
Based on examination of accident investigations and
incident reports, Orasanu, Davison and Fisher (1997)
summarized how ineffective communication can
compromise aviation safety in three basic ways: 1)
Wrong information may be used; 2) Situation
awareness may be lost; 3) Participants may fail to
build a shared model of the present situation. Along
with the increasing volume of international traffic,
the risk of communication errors escalates even
further because of participants’ culture and native
language differences (Orasanu et al, 1997).

Towards a positive taxonomy
Language issues will have to be better documented in
the future because of the international nature of
aviation that keeps growing at a fast pace. Authorities
may have to decide about implementing the
systematic use of the English language for radio
communications
in
areas
with
significant
international traffic. In such cases, a risk analysis
should also take into account the times when the use
of the local language prevented a misunderstanding
on a non-native speaker from turning into a
hazardous situation. To have a more complete picture
of the reality of operations, the reporting system must
flag and record the safety nets, such as the use of
another language, which prevented accidents.

Triggering factors and safety nets
In 1998, India formally called on the ICAO
Assembly to take action to ensure that pilots and
controllers “are proficient in conducting and
comprehending radiotelephony communications in
the English language”. In its proposed resolution,
India specifically cited the 1995 Controlled Flight
Into Terrain (CFIT) accident in Cali, Colombia, and
the midair collision near Delhi as having indicated
“lack of proficiency and comprehension of the
English language by flight crews and air traffic
controllers” (FSF, 2006).

Ad-hoc taxonomies for what went right would give a
better picture for the safety role of language in
aviation. Like for the negative aspects of the
“language barrier”, Human Factors have generally
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been considered in relation to accident causes or as
performance limitations. However, there has been
some work on: 1) considering the human factor as a
safety factor, 2) recording successful human
interventions in databases and 3) capitalizing on
positive taxonomy to increase the resilience of the
aeronautical system (Boudou et al, 2006). A positive
taxonomy encompassing linguistic factors would
complete proactive and data-driven initiatives that
focus on incidents instead of accidents.
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Conclusion
Linguistic factors represent a vast domain for safety
analyses. The ADREP taxonomy currently highlights
the “language barrier”, “accent” and “language”.
They could possibly become more detailed with subcategories (context and expectations, code switching,
speech intelligibility, paralinguistic factors, aviation
English jargon ambiguities) and/or their definitions at
the level of the usage notes could be completed to
facilitate their codification. Nevertheless, the current
taxonomy is sufficient enough to describe and
explain what went wrong. On the other hand, the
safety nets (e.g. third party intervention, use of native
language) that saved the day need to be categorized
and recorded.
The difficulties encountered in analyzing linguistic
data both at a clinical level (on an accident case) or at
an epidemiological level (on a wider set of reports)
can be expanded to other types of safety analyses that
focus on contributing factors. Data-driven initiatives
first need data (i.e. coded information), ideally data
recording the strengths and weaknesses of the
aviation system. These data must be based on facts,
which should be recorded in a consistent manner.
Finally analytical tools must take into account a
logical cause and effect relationship in order to
produce convincing findings. Therefore, data-driven
safety initiatives should always consider its origin,
quality and consistency. This highlights the need to
have a global approach to ultimately producing
consistent data to give decision-makers a more
complete picture of the aviation system, such as the
pros and cons of the systematic use of the English
language for air traffic control.
References
Air Accident Investigation & Aviation Safety
Board (2006). Aircraft Accident Report on Helios
Airways Flight HCY522, Boeing 737-31S, at
Grammatiko, Hellas, on 14 August 2005. Hellenic
Republic. Ministry of Transport & Communication.
Boudou, B., Pouliquen, Y., Ferrante, O. (2006).

82

Prinzo, O.V., Britton, T.W. (1993). ATC / Pilot
Voice Communications. A Survey of the Literature.
Federal
Aviation
Administration
Report
DOT/FAA/AM-93/20, November 1993.
Van Es, G.W.H., Eurocontrol (2004). Air-ground
Communication Safety Study: An analysis of pilotcontroller occurrences. Eurocontrol, June 16, 2004.
Van Es, G.W.H., Wever, R., Verbeek, M.,
Eurocontrol (2006). Air-ground communication
safety study: Causes and Recommendations.
DAP/SAF 2006-09. Eurocontrol, January 16, 2006.

83

